Introduction
Hours worked rose 34 percent in the United States during World War II.This increase occurred even though the military draft reduced the labor force by 11 percent. Many economists and historians argue that neoclassical economic theory conventional preferences, constant returns to scale technology, and competitive markets cannot account for this large increase.
Instead, they argue that accounting for economic performance during World War II requires departing from the neoclassical environment.
Some researchers, such as Mulligan 1998 , argue that alternative preference speci cations are required to account for the increase in hours worked. In particular, he suggests that patriotism may h a v e played an important role in understanding the large increase in economic activity. Others, such as Rotemberg and Woodford 1991, argue that non-competitive markets are required to account for wartime economic performance. They suggest that imperfect competition and endogenous mark-ups may have played an important role in understanding the increase in hours worked and changes in wage rates.
In this paper, we re-examine whether standard theory can account for macroeconomic performance during World War II, including changes in hours worked, consumption, investment, and wages and interest rates. To do this, we construct a dynamic, general equilibrium model with a standard aggregate production function, standard preferences, and competitive markets. The model draws on earlier macroeconomic analyses of World War IIbyBraun and McGrattan 1993 and Ohanian 1997 . 1 The model includes some important w artime shocks: large increases in government purchases, uncertainty over the timing of the war, large reduc- 1 Other recent papers that analyze the e ects of large scal shocks include Rotemberg and Woodford 1992 , Fatas and Mihov 1998 , Ramey and Shapiro 1997 , Blanchard and Perotti 1999 , and Edelberg et al. 1999 . These papers use vector autoregressions VAR and report theVAR's impulse response functions of scal shocks to macroeconomic variables. tions in the labor force due to the draft, large changes in tax rates on factor incomes, rationing, and the possibility o f a post-war depression. To understand the macroeconomic e ect of each shock, we sequentially introduce one shock at a time to the model and compute the equilibrium. This shows how each shock a ects prices and quantities. When all the shocks have been added, we compute the equilibrium of the economy and compare the predictions of the model for quantities and prices to actual quantities and prices.
Our main nding is that standard theory can account for economic performance during World War II. The model predicts a large increase in hours, signi cant decreases in consumption and private investment, and signi cant decreases in after-tax wages and interest rates. Both uncertainty over the timing of the end of the war and the possibility o f a post-war depression are important factors behind the ability o f the model to account for high labor input and low after-tax wages and interest rates. This result stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that alternative preferences or environments are required to successfully understand the U.S. wartime economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments made against neoclassical theory for understanding World War II, and identi es the most puzzling wartime observations from the perspective of neoclassical theory. Section 3 presents the model economy, and discusses choices for parameter values. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes. Rotemberg and Woodford 1991 and Mulligan 1998 argue that standard competitive theory cannot account for the movements in hours and wages during World War II.
Background
Standard theory predicts that temporary increases in government purchases leads to higher labor input through two channels: wealth e ects and intertemporal substitution e ects. Theory predicts that the negative wealth e ect from high government purchases leads households to work harder and consume less. Theory also predicts that temporarily high government purchases lead to temporarily high interest rates. This intertemporal substitution channel also leads households to work harder and consume less. The higher labor input resulting from higher government purchases reduces labor productivity and the equilibrium real wage. See, for example, Hall 1980 , Barro 1981 and Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 . Rotemberg and Woodford 1991 argue that real wages did not decline during World War II, and therefore standard competitive theory cannot account for this change.
In World War II, increases in government spending were accompanied by large increases in tax rates. Standard theory predicts that increases in tax rates lead to a fall in after tax factor prices and therefore a fall in labor input. Mulligan 1998 argues that we did not observe a decline in hours or employment and therefore standard competitive theory cannot account for World War II. Figure 1 summarizes these arguments graphically. Both graphs show labor supply and demand schedules. In the top panel, we consider a shift in the marginal utility due to an increase in government spending. An increase in government spending has a wealth e ect which leads to lower consumption and higher marginal utility and lower leisure. Equilibrium real wages w are lower and equilibrium hours of work L are higher. Rotemberg and Woodford use this prediction as evidence that the standard model could not account for events during World War II. They argued that both hours and real wages rose signi cantly during the war.
Mulligan 1998 dismisses the view that wealth e ects were important. He focuses instead on the fact that income tax rates rose signi cantly during the war. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , we show what happens when the tax rate goes from zero to positive. The labor supply shifts up, real wages rise, but after-tax real wages fall. As a result, equilibrium hours of work fall. Mulligan uses this prediction as evidence that the standard model could not account for events during World War II. He argues that after-tax real wages fell and hours rose signi cantly during the war.
In the next section, we describe in more detail the theory that Rotemberg and Woodford 1991 and Mulligan 1998 where K p;t is the beginning-of-period private capital stock for the economy in t, K g;t is the beginning-of-period public capital stock used by the private sector in t, Z t is the level of technology in t, and L p;t is the total labor input in the private sector in t. We assume that technology grows at rate g z and stays on trend through the war, Z t = z1 + g z t . Braun and McGrattan 1993 nd that total factor productivity is roughly at its trend level during the war. See their Table 3 .
We include government capital in production because the federal government nanced large increases in industrial construction and producers' durable equipment during World War II.There were signi cant increases to the productive capacity of the aircraft, automotive, and aluminum industries. Gordon 1969 estimates that government-owned, privately operated capital GOPO resulted in a 30 percent increase in manufacturing's capital stock between 1940 and 1945. See also Jaszi 1970 , Gordon 1970 , and Wasson et al. 1970 McGrattan 1993 use this fact to point out that increases in government investment lead to shifts in the labor demand curve of Figure 1 t h us, providing an alternative story to Rotemberg and Woodford's 1992 countercyclical markups.
We will denote investment spending by the government b y I g and consumption spending by C g . The period t budget constraint i s g i v en by
where r g is the rental rate for government capital. Government capital evolves according to
with K g0 and the process for I gt given. Notice that we assume that private and public capital depreciate at the same rate. Here we are assuming that wage payments to soldiers are included in transfers to draftees. Total government spending therefore is given by G t = C gt +I gt +N t a t w t l: 7
To close the model, we now specify the stochastic processes that the family takes as given when solving its optimization problem in 1. Since rms are competitive, the prices that they pay for factors of production are given by their marginal products. Therefore the rental rates in 2 and 5 and the wage rate in 2 are equal to the partial derivatives of the production function F in 4 with respect to K p , K g , and L p , respectively. Transfers T are de ned residually from the government budget constraint 5; they depend on economy-wide endogenous prices and quantities as well as exogenous government purchases. The processes for the draft a t , the tax rates l;t , k;t , and components of government purchases C g;t and I g;t are assumed to depend on one underlaying state variable, s t , which is the scal state." 3 A simple example of the scal state is where s t took on two values`war' or`peace'. In war, government spending, taxes rates, and the fraction of the population impressed into military service would be high and in peace they would be low. In the next section we describe in detail the scal state that we use and the values that a, l , k , C g , I g take.
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of allocations for households c c;t , c d;t , l c;t , i p;t , k p;t ; allocations for rms K p;t , L p;t ; and prices r p;t , r g;t , and w t that satisfy the following conditions: i taking prices and exogenous policies for a t , k;t , l;t , and T t as given, households maximize expected utility subject to constraints 2-3; ii taking prices as given, rms period by period maximize pro ts Y , r p K p , r g K g , wL p ; iii factor markets clear:
iv the resource constraint:
holds where C p;t = N t a t c c;t + N t 1 , a t c d;t and I p;t = N t i p;t ; and v transfers satisfy 5.
Because of our choice of preferences, consumption levels for civilians and draftees will be equated. Below, we use c p;t to denote the per-capita consumption of both types. We will also use the convention that lowercase letters denote per-capita quantities e.g., c g;t =C g;t =N t .
We turn now to a comparison of simulations of this model to U.S. aggregate data during the war. We rst choose parameters. We then run numerical experiments. and b govern substitutability and relative productivities of private and public capital. We assume that these two types of capital are perfect substitutes and equally productive.
Parameter Values and Exogenous Processes
The rate of depreciation of both types of capital is set equal to = 0 : 05. This value is consistent with actual observations on investment and capital stocks. We scale the technology z so that output in 1946 is equal to 1. Growth rates are set to beconsistent with U.S. trends, so that g n = 1 : 6 and g z = 1 : 6. We also scale to guarantee that the postwar capital-output ratio is similar in the model and the data. Finally, the hours for soldiers is set to be l = 5 0 = 84 which implies that they work 50 out of their 84 discretionary hours perweek.
Realizations of the exogenous processes are chosen so that they are exactly in line with their data counterparts. The input series are plotted in Figures 2-4 . The nonstationary series, i g and c g , h a v e been detrended by 1 + g z t and scaled by 9,918 1982 dollars which is per-capita GNP in 1946 less per-capita military compensation in 1946 i.e., the equivalent of output in our model. The speci c sources and transformations are provided in Appendix A1. In some of the experiments of the next section, we assume that the processes are stochastic. In each case we discuss how the transition matrices were modeled.
In Figure 2 , we show the components of government purchases. In`government investment' we include only part of total government investment during the war. In particular, we include investment relevant to production in the private sector and the civilian government sector. The increase in this series is due primarily to GOPO.`Government consumption' is treated as a residual; it is given by total spending less government investment and military compensation. A large component of that is increased military equipment. Military equipment is recorded in the National Accounts as investment, but we do not treat it as an input in civilian production. Figure 3 shows the fraction of the population 16 and over that is employed by the military. Not surprisingly, the pattern mimics military wages with the peak coming in 1944.
At the peak, 11 percent of the population over the age of 16 was in the army.
In Figure 4 , we display the tax rates for labor and capital income constructed by Joines 1981. This picture clearly shows that there was a large rise in both tax rates. The labor tax rate more than doubled in two years between 1940 and 1942 and the capital tax rate went from 45 percent to roughly 60 percent. We n o w turn to assessing the macroeconomic e ects of these shocks in our model economy.
Results
This section compares the model's predictions for hours, consumption, investment, output, wages, and interest rates during World War IIwith the data. We do this by presenting a graph of the predicted variable from the model with the actual variable.
First, we present the time series of interest. This is done in Figure 5 . All trending series have been divided by 1 + g z t and divided by 9,918 so that output GNP less military compensation has a mean of one. The speci c number that we use to scale the series will not matter this is chosen so that consumption and the capital stocks are in interpretable units.
In Figure 6 , we show the same series for a shorter time horizon: 1941-1950.
Because Woodford 1991,1992 and Mulligan have focused attention on real wages, we show four di erent series. Woodford 1991,1992 use total compensation for civilians divided by the private value added de ator. Here, we use the tax rate of Joines 1981 in Figure 4 to convert it to after-tax. Mulligan uses the wage rate for manufacturing production workers for 25 industries de ated by the CPI and multiplied by the tax rate of Barro and Sahasakul 1986 . The rst shows a rise in after-tax wages throughout the war and the latter shows a decline. To see what the de ator does, we include civilian wages de ated by the CPI. To see the di erence between manufacturing wages and civilian wages, we include both measures which are both constructed using NIPA data. It is clear that the estimates of wages, prices, and tax rates are quite di erent.
Before presenting the predictions of the model with all the elements included, we rst display the theoretical predictions of a stripped down version of the model that Rotemberg 1991 and Mulligan 1998 critique. This model is the optimal growth model and the predictions are responses to an increase in government purchases.
We then run our main experiments. For these experiments, we include government capital, the draft, and distortionary taxation. The model is parameterized so that with government spending, military wages, and distortionary taxes at levels given by Figures 2-4 , the model series have the same means as the data. Thus, we can make a direct comparison of model time series and the data.
In the rst experiment, we assume that agents perfectly predict the paths of spending and taxes shown in Figures 2-4 . Second, we allow for uncertainty about entering the war and its duration. Third, we assume that rationing was in e ect. Fourth, we allow for the possibility of a post-war depression.
In each case, we assume that the initial state in the model is equal to the capital stocks and scal state observed in 1941 i.e., k p;1941 = 1 : 89 and k g;1941 = 0 : 55. Because the economy is just coming out of the Great Depression, we cannot really assume that the the economy is in a steady state in 1940 when comparing model and data. We only start with steady states when describing theoretical impulse responses.
A. Increase Government Spending
We begin with the most commonly studied case. There is no draft, no productive government spending, government spending is entirely nanced with lump sum taxes, and the future time path of government expenditures is known with certainty.
We start the simulation from a steady state with g and c g both equal to 0.1635 which For interest rates we plot the levels. In the model, 1941 is the date of the shock." In response to the large wealth e ect, consumption and leisure fall immediately. Private consumption falls roughly 11 percent and civilian hours of work rise roughly 15 percent. As Figure 1 shows, the shift in the labor supply curve with the capital stock xed initially also implies that wages fall. For our numerical example, the decline in wages which are not taxed here is roughly 6 percent by the end of the war. Now consider the dynamic response of the model which is not discernible from Figure   1 . Once it is known that the country is going to war, interest rates rise and they continue to rise until the end of the war. Investment rises slightly in 1942 but then falls as government spending crowds out private consumption and investment. In this example, it is not high wage rates that drive higher labor input wage rates are lower. Rather, it is high interest rates that drive households to work harder. This last prediction is what leads Mulligan 1998 to question neoclassical theory for World War II.
B. Increase Government Defense Spending
We now want to assume that the increased government spending is primarily increased defense spending as was the case for World War II. We include all components of spending shown in Figure 2 , rates of conscription as in Figure 3 , and distortionary taxes as in Figure 4 .
We compare the simulated paths of the model to the actual realizations in Figure 6 . 5 The initial capital stocks are assumed to be equal to k p = 1 : 89 and k g = 0 : 55 which are the 1941 levels of private and public non-military capital, respectively. We assume for now that individuals in 1941 know for certain that they are going to war, and they know the exact path that spending and tax rates will take. After 1950, we assume that inputs do not change from their 1950 levels.
The results of the experiment are displayed in Figure 8 . Notice that in the model, hours and output in 1941 are much higher than in the data. This is due to the fact that there is no uncertainty that the United States will be at war in 1942. However, in the remaining years, these series match up well with the data. The percent deviations at the peak of the war from the post-war trends are very similar. On the other hand, the patterns of private consumption in the model and data are quite di erent. Private consumption in the model is the same as its data counterpart in 1946 but lies above in all other years. The model consumption steadily rises during the war whereas in the data it initially falls for several periods. The capital stock in the model and data are set equal in 1941. Both fall during the war and then rise. In the model, however, there is a signi cant rise in investment initially. After-tax real wages in the model display a similar pattern to those for manufacturing and both are below their trends throughout the decade. The real interest rate in the model is above its trend level of roughly 2.83 percent and increases to 4.33 percent. This is much higher than Barro's 1987 average estimate of ,0:1 percent. We see later that expectations will play an important role for this picture. Mulligan's critique of neoclassical theory also emerges in this example high labor input is associated with high interest rates.
C. Add Uncertainty About Entering the War and its Duration
So far we have assumed that individuals had perfect foresight and therefore knew the path for the scal variables. We now introduce uncertainty about the scal state. We rst assume that there is some uncertainty about entering and ending the war. We will see that this uncertainty dampens the initial responses and leads to roughly constant real interest rates. The real interest rates, however, are on average high. Therefore, we consider introducing rationing which has a negative e ect on marginal rates of substitution and therefore on real interest rates.
We also introduce uncertainty about a post-war depression which has the e ect of dampening interest rates.
Suppose that individuals do not know with certainty that they will enter the war in 1942. Assume, for example, that the probability is in fact only 10 percent that they go to war in 1942. Once at war, they know with certainty what the path of taxes and spending will be during the war. Suppose, in addition, that there is uncertainty about when the war will end.
In Figure 9 , we display transition probabilities for the case we consider. In 1941, there is a 10 percent chance that the war begins right away. During the war years, three things are possible: staying at current levels of spending and taxes, transiting to the next stage of the war, or ending the war. The solid line is the path that is actually realized thus, during the war they observe levels of spending and taxes consistent with U.S. levels. However, since there is some probability of staying at current levels or ending the war altogether, the duration of the war is uncertain.
Government spending in 1945 was close to its peak wartime level, the fraction in the military were high, and tax rates were high. See Figure 2 . If the end of the war is declared, then individuals put a high probability on transiting to the post-war trend the 1950 levels of spending and taxes and a low probability o n the particular transition path that was actually observed. This choice captures the fact that individuals know roughly what to expect for postwar levels of spending and taxes but not exactly. As before, the solid line in Figure 9 is the path actually taken in the simulation.
In Figure 10 we display the results of the rst experiment with uncertainty. In this case, we assume during the war that there is a 10 percent c hance of staying at current levels of spending, a 80 percent chance of transiting to the next stage, and a 10 percent chance of the war ending. This is close to the extreme assumption of perfect foresight during the war. Notice that uncertainty in 1941 leads to a smaller increase in hours and GNP and smaller decreases in consumption and investment. The less likely it is that we transit to the state with spending and taxes at 1942 U.S. levels, the smaller are the changes in these variables. With hours now rising between 1941 and 1942, there is a larger decline in after-tax real wages.
Notice that with uncertainty about the duration of the war, the interest rates do not jump up as much and consumption does somewhat better in tting the pattern actually observed.
The only real failure of the model is its implications for the level of the real interest rates.
Because nominal interest rates were very low during World War II, most estimates of real interest rates are near zero. Mulligan's critique still remains.
D. Add Rationing
During the war, goodswere rationed. In our previous simulation we found that while consumption fell slightly, it did not fall as much a s U.S. private consumption. Also, the model predicts high real interest rates during the war while most historians estimate that the real interest rate was low. If we add rationing to the model, we can possibly correct both failings of the model. Rationing leads to lower consumption, expectations of lower growth rates of consumption, and therefore lower real interest rates.
Consider adding the following constraints to the problem of a typical family in 1: The results of the simulation are displayed in Figure 11 . A comparison of Figures 10 and   11 show that the only signi cant e ects of rationing are in the patterns of private consumption and real interest rates. While we do get a signi cant decline in the real interest rate during the war roughly 1 percentage point the rate is still high relative to estimates on bond yields for the United States. To address Mulligan's criticism, we want to have after-tax wage rates and the real interest rate below its trend level with hours of work above its trend level.
E. A Check on Sensitivity
A s a c heck on the sensitivity of our results to choices of transition probabilities, we redo experiments 3 and 4 using a higher probability of staying at current levels of spending and taxes.
In Figures 12 and 13 , we report results for these simulations. In these cases, we assume during the war that there is a 50 percent chance of staying at current levels of spending, a The transition matrix is assumed to bethe same as in experiments 5 and 6. The only di erence is that agents think that they will enter a post-war depression when the war ends.
This state is never realized but does a ect expectations. If the state were realized, agents expect that their hours of work would beat most 80 percent of normal levels as was true in the Great Depression. Thus, we c hoose l max to be 80 percent of 0.27 if the`depression state' is realized.
When we run this experiment we nd that all series match up well except for hours.
Hours of work are too high relative t o the data even with a lower than average after-tax wage rate and and a lower than average real interest rate. As a result, we make one more change:
we decrease the elasticity of labor by lowering from 0 to ,0:7. We also lower from 2.3 to 1.9 so as to achieve a postwar trend in hours of 27 percent. The results for the case with no rationing are displayed in Figure 14 .
Overall, the t in Figure 14 is remarkable given the simplicity of the model. In both the model and the data, GNP and hours are up roughly 40 percent above their postwar levels.
In both the model and the data, consumption falls initially, stays low, and then recovers. The model still predicts too much initial investment relative to the data but the t is much better than in our earlier simulations. After-tax real wages in the model fall about as much wages in U.S. manufacturing. Interest rates fall and stay down throughout the war. In this simulation, the trend rate is 3.57 percent. Thus, both after-tax real wages and real interest rates are below trend and still we see hours rising 40 percent.
For the simulation of Figure 15 , we k eep all parameters the same except that we impose rationing during the war. This implies a better t of consumption but similar results for all other variables. As in the case with no rationing, we nd hours signi cantly above trend despite the fact that real interest rates and wage rates are below trend levels. This nal case makes signi cant progress in meeting the challenge set out by Mulligan. 6. Conclusion
The large World War II economic expansion has long puzzled economists and historians.
Previous studies of World War II Barro, Braun and McGrattan, and Ohanian have shown that neoclassical theory could account for wartime economic performance, but required either large increases in after-tax wage rates and or interest rates. Since there is little evidence of these increases, some researchers have concluded that signi cant departures from standard theory, such as preference shocks in the form of patriotism, or time-varying mark-ups, are required to understand economic activity during this period. Our results show that this conclusion is premature. Introducing plausible features into the standard model uncertainty over the duration of the war, rationing, and fear of a post-war depression allows the neoclassical model to account for World War II economic performance.
In particular, the model predicts a large increase in hours worked during the war and predicts decreases in low after-tax wages and interest rates. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we conclude that there is no obvious need to incorporate imperfect competition Woodford 1991,1992 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
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